


# A Secret Enriched Visual Cryptography

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
# Background

- ▶ Visual Cryptography (VC) has the advantage of “stacking to see”, but suffers from large pixel expansion and low information rate.
- ▶ Aim of this work: How to let the VC scheme carry more secrets?
- ▶ Our approach: Embed the output of a private-key system into the input random numbers of VC.

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# Overall view of a (2,2)-VCS

- ▶ A (2,2)-VCS



# Formal Def. of $(k, n)$ - VCS

- ▶ Definition 1. Let  $k, n, m, l$  and  $h$  be non-negative integers satisfying  $2 \leq k \leq n$  and  $0 \leq l < h \leq m$ . The two sets of  $n * m$  Boolean matrices  $(C_0, C_1)$  constitute a  $(k, n)$ -VCS if the following properties are satisfied:
  - ▶ 1. (Contrast) For any  $s \in C_0$ , the OR of any  $k$  out of the  $n$  rows of  $s$ , is a vector  $v$  that, satisfies  $w(v) \leq l$ .
  - ▶ 2. (Contrast) For any  $s \in C_1$ , the OR of any  $k$  out of the  $n$  rows of  $s$ , is a vector  $v$  that, satisfies  $w(v) \geq h$ .
  - ▶ 3. (Security) For any  $i_1 < i_2 < \dots < i_t$  in  $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  with  $t < k$ , the two collections of  $t * m$  matrices  $F_0$  and  $F_1$  obtained by restricting each  $n * m$  matrix in  $C_0$  and  $C_1$  to rows  $i_1, i_2, \dots, i_t$ , are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same matrices with the same frequencies.



# Shamir's (t, n)–PSSS

- ▶  $f(x) = (a_0 + a_1x + \dots + a_{t-1}x^{t-1}) \bmod p$ , where  $a_0$  is the secret from  $GF(p)$  and  $a_1, \dots, a_{t-1}$  are randomly drawn element from  $GF(p)$ .
- ▶ Encoding: The  $n$  shares can be calculated by  $f(1)$ ,  $f(2)$ , ...,  $f(n)$ .
- ▶ Decoding:  $f(x)$  can be reconstructed from any  $t$  of  $n$  shares, and hence the secret  $f(0)$  can be computed.


- ▶ Background
- ▶ Preliminaries
- ▶ **Our work**




# What is a $(k, t, n)$ -ESSVCS ?

- $k$ : the VCS threshold
- $t$ : the covert data threshold
- $n$ : the number of participants
- ▶  $(C_0, C_1)$  require that any  $t$  rows can uniquely determine a share matrix
- ▶ Generally, it is required that  $t \geq k$

# Encoding of ESSVCS



# Decoding of ESSVCS




# A (2,2,2)-ESSVCS

- ▶ The sets of share matrices of a (2, 2, 2)-ESSVCS are as follows:

$$C_0 = \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} 10 \\ 10 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 01 \\ 01 \end{bmatrix} \right\} \text{ and } C_1 = \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} 10 \\ 01 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 01 \\ 10 \end{bmatrix} \right\}$$

- ▶ The principle of choosing a share matrix is that: if the random input is 0, we choose the 1st share matrix in  $C_0$  or  $C_1$ ; if the random input is 1, we choose the 2nd share matrix.
- ▶ From another hand, we also can get to know the random input: if the first share matrix is chosen then the random input is 0, and if the second share matrix is chosen then the random input is 1

# The procedure of the above (2,2,2)-ESSVCS



# Bandwidth of the ESSVCS

- ▶ Bandwidth of the ESSVCS is defined by the maximum amount of covert data it carries.
- ▶ Theoretically, the amount of covert data carried by a pixel  $i$  is  $\log_2 |C_i|$
- ▶ Denote columns in the basis matrix  $M_i$  as  $c_1, \dots, c_e$  and multiplicities of these columns as  $a_1, \dots, a_e$ . The number of share matrices in  $C_i$  is:

$$|C_i| = \frac{(\sum_{i=1}^e a_i)!}{\prod_{i=1}^e a_i!}$$

- ▶ Considering the canonical basis matrices of threshold scheme constructed by Droste, we have the following table:



# Bandwidth of a white pixel

$k \backslash n$	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
2	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
3		4!	$\frac{6!}{2!}$	$\frac{8!}{3!}$	$\frac{10!}{4!}$	$\frac{12!}{5!}$	$\frac{14!}{6!}$	$\frac{16!}{7!}$	$\frac{18!}{8!}$
4			8!	$\frac{15!}{3!2!}$	$\frac{24!}{6!3!}$	$\frac{35!}{10!4!}$	$\frac{48!}{15!5!}$	$\frac{63!}{21!6!}$	$\frac{80!}{28!7!}$
5				16!	$\frac{30!}{3!(2!)^6}$	$\frac{48!}{6!(3!)^7}$	$\frac{70!}{10!(4!)^8}$	$\frac{96!}{15!(5!)^9}$	$\frac{126!}{21!(6!)^{10}}$
6					32!	$\frac{70!}{4!(2!)^{21}3!}$	$\frac{128!}{10!(3!)^{28}6!}$	$\frac{210!}{20!(4!)^{36}10!}$	$\frac{320!}{35!(5!)^{45}15!}$
7						64!	$\frac{140!}{4!(2!)^{28}(3!)^8}$	$\frac{256!}{10!(3!)^{36}(6!)^9}$	$\frac{420!}{20!(4!)^{45}(10!)^{10}}$
8							128!	$\frac{315!}{5!(3!)^{36}(2!)^{36}4!}$	$\frac{640!}{15!(6!)^{45}(3!)^{45}10!}$
9								256!	$\frac{630!}{5!(3!)^{45}(2!)^{120}(4!)^{10}}$
10									512!

Table 1: The number of share matrices in  $C_0$



# Bandwidth of a black pixel

$k \backslash n$	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
2	2!	3!	4!	5!	6!	7!	8!	9!	10!
3		4!	$\frac{6!}{2!}$	$\frac{8!}{3!}$	$\frac{10!}{4!}$	$\frac{12!}{5!}$	$\frac{14!}{6!}$	$\frac{16!}{7!}$	$\frac{18!}{8!}$
4			8!	$\frac{15!}{(2!)^5}$	$\frac{24!}{(3!)^6}$	$\frac{35!}{(4!)^7}$	$\frac{48!}{(5!)^8}$	$\frac{63!}{(6!)^9}$	$\frac{80!}{(7!)^{10}}$
5				16!	$\frac{30!}{3!(2!)^6}$	$\frac{48!}{6!(3!)^7}$	$\frac{70!}{10!(4!)^8}$	$\frac{96!}{15!(5!)^9}$	$\frac{126!}{21!(6!)^{10}}$
6					32!	$\frac{70!}{(3!)^7(2!)^7}$	$\frac{128!}{(6!)^8(3!)^8}$	$\frac{210!}{(10!)^9(4!)^9}$	$\frac{320!}{(15!)^{10}(5!)^{10}}$
7						64!	$\frac{140!}{4!(2!)^{28}(3!)^8}$	$\frac{256!}{10!(3!)^{36}(6!)^9}$	$\frac{420!}{20!(4!)^{45}(10!)^{10}}$
8							128!	$\frac{315!}{(4!)^9(2!)^{84}(3!)^9}$	$\frac{640!}{(10!)^{10}(3!)^{120}(6!)^{10}}$
9								256!	$\frac{630!}{5!(3!)^{45}(2!)^{120}(4!)^{10}}$
10									512!

Table 2: The number of share matrices in  $C_1$

# Bandwidth of the ESSVCS

- ▶ Theorem 4. For a secret image  $S_l$  which consists of  $n_w$  white pixels and  $n_b$  black pixels, the bandwidth  $W$  of the ESSVCS is  $W = \lfloor n_w \log_2 |C_0| + n_b \log_2 |C_1| \rfloor$ , and it is achieved when using the  $q_a$ -pixel encryption model where  $q_a = n_w + n_b$ .

# Comparison of ESSVCS and TiOISSS

$k \backslash n$	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
2	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
3		$\frac{4!}{2!2!}$	$\frac{6!}{3!3!}$	$\frac{8!}{4!4!}$	$\frac{10!}{5!5!}$	$\frac{12!}{6!6!}$	$\frac{14!}{7!7!}$	$\frac{16!}{8!8!}$	$\frac{18!}{9!9!}$
4			$\frac{8!}{4!4!}$	$\frac{9!6!}{15!}$	$\frac{16!8!}{24!}$	$\frac{25!10!}{35!}$	$\frac{36!12!}{48!}$	$\frac{49!14!}{63!}$	$\frac{64!16!}{80!}$
5				$\frac{16!}{8!8!}$	$\frac{30!}{15!15!}$	$\frac{48!}{24!24!}$	$\frac{70!}{35!35!}$	$\frac{96!}{48!48!}$	$\frac{126!}{63!63!}$
6					$\frac{32!}{16!16!}$	$\frac{70!}{40!30!}$	$\frac{128!}{80!48!}$	$\frac{210!}{140!70!}$	$\frac{320!}{224!96!}$
7						$\frac{64!}{32!32!}$	$\frac{140!}{70!70!}$	$\frac{256!}{128!128!}$	$\frac{420!}{210!210!}$
8							$\frac{128!}{64!64!}$	$\frac{315!}{175!140!}$	$\frac{640!}{384!256!}$
9								$\frac{256!}{128!128!}$	$\frac{630!}{315!315!}$
10									$\frac{512!}{256!256!}$

Table 3: The number of share matrices with different types in Lin et al.'s TiOISSS

*Thank you for your attention*

Any questions?